

Mass Atrocity Prevention and Response: Protecting Civilians Using US Joint Forces

**A Monograph
by
MAJ Richard J. Fonyi
United States Army**



**School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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Major Richard J. Fonyi

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Approved by:

_____	Monograph Director
Alice Butler-Smith, Ph.D.	

_____	Second Reader
Michael W. Snow, COL	

_____	Director, School of Advanced Military Studies
Thomas C. Graves, COL, IN	

_____	Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.	

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Abstract

MASS ATROCITY PREVENTION AND RESPONSE: PROTECTING CIVILIANS USING US JOINT FORCES by MAJ Richard J. Fonyi, United States Army, 49 pages.

This monograph explores the evolution of genocide and mass atrocities from the 20th Century until today, focusing specifically on the ability and desirability of the US to employ the US Joint Force to protect innocent civilians from the hands of brutal dictators. Public discourse in the US today generally favors doing something to protect civilians rather than doing nothing. Reliving the not-too-distant memories of Rwanda and Kosovo is painful for most US citizens who witnessed the nightly newscasts and read the front page of the local newspaper. These two genocides demonstrate how a policy of nonintervention and limited intervention can lead to a failed strategy with horrific effects on civilian populations. US Joint Forces can respond to a wide array of challenges and arguably does so better than any other force in the world. Should the US Joint Force deploy to protect civilians, even if a vital national interest is not at stake? This author contends that it should and this monograph explores and defends such an assertion, beginning with a definition of genocide, the evolution of genocide through the 20th century to today, and a review of the narrative for and against intervention. Included in this is a brief discussion of the morality of intervention and the effects on the US Joint Force, as part of the narrative. The author describes the future environment and establishes the strategic context by which the US Joint Force could potentially operate in, given the political will. This monograph reviews two distinct genocides, Rwanda and Kosovo, tragic events that were both unnecessary and the driving forces behind *The Responsibility to Protect (R2P)*. The concept of protecting civilians using coercive force is vague and there are serious gaps in US Joint doctrine that directly affects how the US Joint Force organizes and operates. After reviewing lessons learned from two recent genocides, the author reviews the strategic context affecting the US Joint Force and concludes with recommendations in force structure and doctrine that informs how to think about the concept of protecting civilians using US Joint Forces.

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Introduction

Nations no longer have the right to be indifferent. The principles of nations' Sovereignty and of non-intervention in their domestic affairs—which remain Valid—nonetheless cannot be construed as a screen behind which one can torture and assassinate.¹

The phrase “Never Again” has become shorthand for the remembrance of the Holocaust. At Buchenwald, the handmade signs made by inmates in April 1945 are long gone, replaced by a stone monument onto which those two hallowed words silently reveal the millions of stories of mutilation and death. In contemporary usage, it now seems like the final words not just of the murder of the Jews of Europe, but on any great crime against humanity that the world failed to prevent from happening. “Never Again” appears on monuments and memorials from Paine, Chile, the town with proportionately more victims of the Pinochet dictatorship than any other place in the country, to the Genocide Museum in Kigali, Rwanda.² The report rendered by the Argentinian Truth Commission set up in 1984 after the fall of the Galtieri dictatorship bore the title “Nunca Mas” – “Never Again” in Spanish. There is now at least one online Holocaust memorial called “Never Again.”³ There is nothing wrong with exclaiming what most of the world believes to be true. Unfortunately, an undeniable gulf exists between the frequency with which the society uses the phrase and reality, which is that 65 years after the liberation of the Nazi concentration camps, “Never Again” remains a promise which no state has ever been willing to deliver on.

The Western world failed to learn the lessons of the Holocaust. The United States (US), through the United Nations (UN), took steps to raise awareness of genocide and mass atrocities

¹His Holiness, Pope John Paul II, in an address to the Fiftieth General Assembly of the United Nations on October 5, 1995, expresses concern about the need to protect the rights of humans and of nations.

² David Rieff, "The Persistence of Genocide," *Policy Review* (2011): 29-40.

³ The Crossover Project, “Never Again: The Houston Holocaust Museum February 4, 2007,” <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YOAiA-m8Ljs> (accessed January 16, 2012).

and inaugurate the term within international law. Unfortunately, remarkably little came of it. If the US displayed more leadership and had taken action, post-Holocaust genocides in Cambodia, Rwanda, Darfur, Bosnia, and Kosovo might be just a gruesome, yet fictional, story. The US was slow to act in the face of genocidal situations to the peril of hundreds of thousands of civilians. Although clear indicators and evidence of potential violence against these civilian populations existed, policymakers assumed an escalation of violence would not occur or that public opinion would not support an intervention. In many cases, the evidence was clear and tragically, policymakers doubted accounts from survivors and refugees and dismissed them as too sensational to be true.⁴ Policymakers trusted the reassurances of the exact governments committing acts of atrocity. Samantha Power demonstrates in her book *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide* that the US continued to believe and accept the promises of Slobodan Milosevic even after orchestration of two genocides in the former Yugoslavia.⁵

The US relied on traditional diplomacy and attempted to broker cease-fire agreements to settle these incidents. The harsh reality is America and other Western powers have not done enough to prevent or stop genocides. There was abundant evidence and enough timely information to know when genocide was happening, but policymakers chose ineffective negotiations and inaction in situations of genocide.⁶ Rather than sending troops to create safe areas for victims, the US and its allies repeatedly did little to help the victims. In the last century, tens of millions of people lost their lives in episodes of mass killings.

Watch how passionately the citizens of the western world, with the US in the lead, demand a response when television screens display images of vivid suffering. The reports of

⁴ Samantha Power, *A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2007), 12-14.

⁵ Ibid, 16.

⁶ Ibid, 284-285.

massacres from Sarajevo and Srebrenica that made the front pages generated disgust and anger that rang out across the world.⁷ Scenes of mutilated and putrid corpses floating on rivers of bloodied water in Rwanda shook the inner sanctum of millions of people across the globe. The western world stood by as murders, rapes, destruction, and dislocation began to unfold in Darfur. History is repeating itself in Syria today. As of the writing of this paper, more than 7,000 civilians perished at the hands of a brutal Assad regime and the numbers continue to rise daily with little coercive action taken to protect lives.

There is no doubt that genocide and mass atrocities exact a horrific human toll. They constitute a direct assault on universal human values, including, most fundamentally, the right to life. These crimes also threaten core US national interests in several ways. First, genocide fuels instability, usually in weak, undemocratic, and corrupt states. These same types of states fund terrorist recruitment and training, promote human trafficking, and create civil strife, all of which result in damaging spillover effects for the entire world.⁸ Genocide and mass atrocities have long-lasting consequences far beyond the states in which they occur. Refugee flows start in bordering countries but often spread throughout the entire region. Humanitarian needs grow, often exceeding the capacities and resources of a generous world. When America fails to act, its standing in the world erodes and the world perceives the US as bystanders to genocide.

This monograph will explore the evolution of genocide and mass atrocities from the 20th Century until today, focusing specifically on the ability and desirability of the US to employ US Joint Forces to protect innocent civilians from the hands of brutal dictators. The Obama administration campaigned in 2008 on a platform that supports universal human rights and won. Public discourse in the US today generally favors doing something to protect civilians rather than

⁷ John G. Heidenrich, *How to Prevent Genocide: A Guide for Policymakers, Scholars, and the Concerned Citizen* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2002), 49-52.

⁸ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001), 5-6.

doing nothing. Reliving the not-too-distant memories of Rwanda and Kosovo is painful for most US citizens who witnessed the nightly newscasts and read the front page of the local newspaper. These two genocides demonstrate how a policy of nonintervention and limited intervention can lead to a failed strategy with horrific effects on civilian populations. President Obama and his administration seek to reassert the US as a global leader and protection of human rights is one way to do so. Committed to this principle, the President has taken action by communicating his intent to protect civilians from genocide and mass atrocities through his strategic guidance to all branches of the government and inevitably to the world. US Joint Forces can respond to a wide array of challenges and arguably does so better than any other force in the world. The question is should they? The answer is yes and the first half of this paper will explore this assertion, beginning with a definition of genocide, the evolution of genocide through the 20th century to today, and a review of the narrative for and against intervention. Included in this will be a brief discussion of the morality of intervention and the effects on the US Joint Force, as part of the narrative. The author will attempt to describe the future environment and set the strategic context by which the US Joint Force will presumably operate in, given the political will. The second half of this paper will begin with case studies of genocide in Rwanda and Kosovo, both tragic events that were unnecessary and the driving forces behind *The Responsibility to Protect (R2P)*.⁹ The concept of protecting civilians using coercive force is vague and there are serious gaps in US Joint doctrine that directly affects how the US Joint Force organizes and operates. After reviewing lessons learned from two recent genocides, the author will review the strategic context affecting the US Joint Force and conclude with recommendations in force structure and doctrine that will help shape how to think about the concept of protecting civilians using US Joint Forces.

⁹ Ibid, 14.

The Crime Without a Name

The term genocide has a relatively short history within international law in relation to its practice throughout thousands of years of humankind. Sanctioned by the International Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and adopted by the United Nations, genocide is the intent to destroy one of four protected groups: racial, national, ethnic, or religious. Genocide is the most serious of all international crimes. Raphael Lemkin, a Polish lawyer of Jewish descent, coined the term “genocide” when he combined a Greek term for people and a Latin term for killing.¹⁰ Lemkin himself a survivor of the Holocaust fled Poland for the US after losing 49 family members to the Nazi program of extermination. Determined to make a difference, he used his extensive background in law and influence within his academic circles to draft policy that would ultimately lead to the prosecution of war criminals committing such heinous crimes as ethnic cleansing. He intended to introduce to the international community a previously non-existent term identifying the systematic killing of a group of people. In 1946, the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) passed the following resolution thanks, in part, to Raphael Lemkin’s tireless efforts:

Genocide is the denial of the right to existence of entire human groups, as homicide is the denial of the right to live of individual human beings; such denial of the right of existence shocks the conscience of mankind, results in great losses to humanity in the form of cultural and other contributions represented by these groups, and is contrary to moral law and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations. Many instances of such crimes of genocide have occurred, when racial, religious, political and other groups have been destroyed, entirely or in part. The punishment of the crime of genocide is a matter of international concern. The General Assembly Therefore, Affirms that genocide is a crime under international law which the civilized world condemns, and for the commission of which principals and accomplices—whether private individuals, public officials or statesmen, and whether the crime is committed on religious, racial, political or any other grounds—are punishable.¹¹

¹⁰ Larry May, *Genocide: A Normative Account* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 4.

¹¹ Gregory H. Stanton, "Genocides, Politicides, and Other Mass Murder since 1945, With Stages in 2005," Genocide Watch, <http://www.genocidewatch.org/genocidetable2005.html> (accessed March 20, 2012).

In international law, genocide has a specialized meaning that is not necessarily in consonant with that of the broad public's understanding of genocide, because it includes acts that do not involve mass killing.¹² Article II of the Convention on Genocide clearly defines these acts directed at the abovementioned protected groups: killing members of the group, causing serious bodily or mental harm members of the group, deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group, and forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.¹³ With the definition of genocide clearly defined by the Convention, the next hurdle was for them to identify who should be held liable for such heinous commissions.

Article III of the Convention on Genocide lists five acts punishable under International law: acts of genocide outlined in Article II, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, attempt to commit genocide, and complicity in genocide.¹⁴ With the law drafted, ratification by the international community was the next step. On December 8, 1948, the UN Convention on Genocide received the requisite amount of votes to enact the law. The US took roughly forty years to ratify the international law making genocide a crime. The hesitancy to ratify this law was due, in part, to potential implications the government of the US could face based on historical genocidal acts committed against the American Indian. Specifically, the American Indian Removal Act of 1830 directly and indirectly resulted in the deaths of countless Cherokee and other Native Americans as the US expanded westward.¹⁵ There were many legal challenges with adopting the proper language for such a complex issue. Understanding the complexities of genocide in international law was as difficult then as it is now.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ David E. Stannard, *American Holocaust: The Conquest of the New World* (Oxford University Press, 1993), 3.

Many of the challenges with understanding genocide in international law are philosophical because of emotion and passion genocide elicits. Legally, what makes genocide unique is technicality that is extremely difficult to prove in the International Court. This technicality is the intent to destroy one of the above-mentioned protected groups in whole or part. Prosecutors can prove intent from statements or orders by the perpetrators. Often, prosecutors must deduce it from a systematic pattern of acts...a pattern that can only arise out of a specific intent. Proving genocidal intent is extremely difficult, as such, it was not until the late 1990s that the international community brought any person accused of genocide before an international tribunal or court and tried for their actions. Understanding the genocidal process can assist in identifying the intent of the perpetrators.

According to Gregory H. Stanton, genocide has eight stages or operational processes. The first stage precedes later stages, but it continues to operate, or remains present, throughout the genocidal process. Each stage reinforces the other. A strategy to prevent genocide should attack each stage throughout the entire process. The eight stages of genocide are classification, symbolization, dehumanization, organization, polarization, preparation, extermination, and denial.¹⁶ Intervention forces, specifically US Joint Forces, must understand the genocide process and its complexities in order to best prepare for what may soon become an operational concept. If the past serves as a prologue for the future, then a review of the last century is critical for the US Joint Force planner to build upon their understanding of genocide as a concept.

The Bloodiest Century: A Review of 20th Century Genocides

The phenomenon of genocide is not new. Smiting entire populations because of ethnicity has deep historical roots in the bible.¹⁷ Despite such distant beginnings, however, the most

¹⁶ For a complete understanding of the eight stages of genocide, refer to Gregory H. Stanton, "The Eight Stages of Genocide," <http://www.genocidewatch.org/8stagesofgenocide.htm>

¹⁷ Book of Deuteronomy 7:1-6 (New Revised Standard Version).

genocidal century yet recorded in human history is uncomfortably recent: the twentieth century. In the Boer War of 1899-1902, waged in what is today South Africa, British colonial troops adopted a counterinsurgency strategy used years earlier by Spanish troops in Cuba. British troops herded Dutch-descended Boer (Afrikaner) civilians into prison-like camps, along with many of the Boers' African friends and servants, causing tens of thousands to die of starvation and disease.¹⁸ The Spaniards had called their own camps *campos de reconcentracion*.¹⁹ The British shortened the term to concentration camps. Decades later this notorious term earned its present connotation from the Nazis.

Racist forms of nationalism often intertwine with genocide, especially in modern times. In 1915-1916 in Turkey, at that time called the Ottoman Empire, a secular nationalist dictatorship known as the "Young Turks" tried to solidify their long-troubled empire by using the First World War as a pretext to massacre the empire's Armenian Christian minority.²⁰ Aside from a few places with a sizable foreign presence of diplomats and journalists resided, almost the entire Armenian population of the empire of perhaps 2 million fled into the desert.²¹ Vast numbers starved to death or were murdered along the way; estimates range from 600,000 to more than 1 million. Most survivors did so by escaping into neighboring lands. Throughout the rest of the twentieth century, various Turkish governments denied even the existence of this genocide. However, the evidence for it is overwhelming. Denials of its existence only obscure the fact that, during its perpetration, many Turks, including a few Turkish governors, bravely opposed it—at great personal risk. What lesson, if any, did the Armenian genocide teach? In a speech he delivered in 1939, just before he launched Nazi Germany's invasion of Poland, Adolf Hitler

¹⁸ Thomas Pakenham, *The Boer War*, 1st American ed. (New York: Random House, 1979), 14-15.

¹⁹ Ben Kiernan, *Blood and Soil: a World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 72-73.

²⁰ Ibid, 395.

²¹ Power, *A Problem from Hell*, 16-17.

revealed what he had learned. With a tone of future vindication, he asked: “Who still talks nowadays about the massacres of the Armenians?”²²

Hitler’s regime murdered an estimated 17 million human beings before and during World War II—and caused millions more to perish through wanton neglect. The noncombat victims of the Nazis included some 5 million Poles, primarily intellectuals. There were at least 6 million Soviet civilians and captured prisoners of war that perished, most of them starved to death, and nearly 800,000 Serbs, most butchered by the Nazis’ Croatian allies. There were hundreds of thousands of Roma (Gypsies) and most notoriously, some 6 million Jews— including 1 million Jewish children.²³

These numbers are immense in part because the Nazis used a few abstract racial definitions, formulated by the Nazis themselves, to condemn entire races of human beings to death. Nazi ideology asserted that Jews, for example, were not merely a different religion but literally a different species, a bastard race biologically inferior to “normal” human beings, a form of social vermin so dangerously malignant that all Jews—all Jews—had to die along with their offspring. Jews therefore suffered the Nazis’ most methodical and sinister means of mass murder, what the Nazis called their “Final Solution to the Jewish Question.” Those methods included mass shootings, burning victims alive, deadly torture, hideous medical experiments, starvation, working victims to death in concentration camps such as Buchenwald, Bergen-Belsen, Dachau, Ravensbruck, and Mauthausen, or gassing the victims—crowded together and naked—in the factory-efficient human extermination complexes of Auschwitz-Birkenau, Chelno, Sobibor, and Treblinka.

²² Kiernan, *Blood and Soil: a World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur*, 417.

²³ Doris L. Bergen, *War and Genocide: A Concise History of the Holocaust* (New York: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003), 233.

Today Jews refer to this nightmare time as the Shoah, more commonly as the Holocaust. Although the murder tally of Nazism pales in comparison to Communism's, Nazism piled up its tally much faster—and had further intended to exterminate other categories of people after exterminating the last Jew.²⁴ Even today, the Holocaust remains the most systematic, most industrialized genocide ever inflicted, in many ways rendering it unique, so unique that any comparisons to it risk belittling how monstrous the Holocaust actually was.

Joseph Stalin perpetrated more mass murder than Adolf Hitler, albeit over a longer reign. In the 1930s Stalin subjected the Soviet Union's own Communist Party and the Red Army to the Great Purges, a deadly "purification" of those institutions through mock trials, imprisonment, forced labor, and executions. According to the once-privileged sources of Andrei Sakharov, the famed Soviet physicist and dissident, more than 1.2 million Soviet Communist Party members — half of the party's total membership—were arrested between 1936 and 1939. Only 50,000 ever regained their freedom. Some 600,000 died by gunshot. Most of the rest died in forced labor camps. Overall, between 1924 and 1953, Stalin's regime murdered at least 20 million people.²⁵

Mao Zedong's regime in China may have been even worse; the official execution records are incomplete. What is known is that during Mao's "Cultural Revolution" in the 1960s and 1970s—when China suffered near chaos from a regime-encouraged terror campaign meant to make the population as fanatically Communist-minded as possible—some 2 million Chinese were killed. Worse was Mao's rule in the 1950s, when several million died, from either avoidable famine or mass execution. Countless others suffered in prisons or in the laogai, a network of forced labor

²⁴ Heidenrich, *How to Prevent Genocide: A Guide for Policymakers, Scholars, and the Concerned Citizen*, 21-22.

²⁵ Kiernan, *Blood and Soil: a World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur*, 417-418.

camps. The overall death toll from Mao's rule from 1949 until 1976 exceeded more than 27 million.²⁶

The ideologies of Nazism and Marxism-Leninism were not the only ones used to justify genocide in the twentieth century. Baathism, an atheistic socialist ideology espoused by Iraq's Saddam Hussein, was the justification for killing the Iraqi Kurds among other groups.²⁷ Genocide raged in the name of anti-Communism as well. In the 1980s, government officials in Guatemala and El Salvador orchestrated the murder of tens of thousands of innocent people, mainly from native tribes, for sympathizing with Marxist guerrillas. In the mid-1970s, the armed forces of Argentina abducted and murdered at least 9,000 Argentines suspected of being Communists, a reign of terror known as the "Dirty War."²⁸ In Indonesia vast numbers of suspected Communists perished within a few months in late 1965; estimates range from 80,000 to over 1 million killed.²⁹ Many political independence movements, from Bangladesh to Bosnia-Herzegovina, suffered a campaign of genocide. No one knows how many people in total died from genocide in the twentieth century, but notable genocide scholar Rudolph Rummel estimates in his seminal work *Death by Government* almost 170,000,000 men, women and children perished.³⁰

Taking the Lead: The US Addresses Humanitarian Intervention

Despite past efforts to prevent or halt genocide, the US watched the number of civilian deaths grow. Such atrocities persisted in the world and the US had to take action. In 2007, former

²⁶ Hong Yung Lee, *The Politics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: A Case Study* (Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 1979).

²⁷ George Black, *Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993), xii-xii.

²⁸ Kiernan, *Blood and Soil: a World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur*, 392.

²⁹ Heidenrich, *How to Prevent Genocide: A Guide for Policymakers, Scholars, and the Concerned Citizen*, 23.

³⁰ R. J. Rummel, *Death by Government* (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1997), 2.

Secretary of State Madeline Albright and Former Secretary of Defense William Cohen chaired a panel of notable academia, military leaders, Congressmen, and think tank professionals to address this persistent problem. Thus, the Genocide Prevention Task Force (GPTF) was born out of an overwhelming desire to figure out the complexities of protecting civilians from mass atrocities and genocide.³¹ They felt with an upcoming election that the timing was ideal to inject their ideas into the political landscape. Despite not having a perfectly clear vision of the future, this panel understood the threat of genocide existed in failed or failing states. They also knew that genocide exacted a horrific toll on humanity and human values. With those guiding principles, the panel set forth to sell the idea that genocide and mass atrocities directly affect US national security interests and that there was a way to prevent this from happening in the future.³² The panel published *Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for US Policymakers* in May 2008 and their ideas triggered a whirlwind of interest at every level of government, both domestically and internationally.

Simultaneously answering a similar call to action after experiencing years of dismissiveness towards genocide prevention within the Department of Defense (DoD), Sarah Sewell organized a team of experts to develop a Mass Atrocity Response planning tool for the military in 2007. Her experiences within the DoD and as a professor at Harvard made her well suited for such a task. Embedded within the Carr Center for Human Rights at Harvard University, Sewell pursued a creative approach to solving the complex problem of preventing and responding to genocide and mass atrocities from a DoD perspective. Her efforts fell completely in line and mutually supported the efforts of the GPTF. With political top cover, Sewell and her team set forth to indoctrinate the DoD with a useful resource that could potentially meet the challenges of

³¹ Madeline K. Albright and William S. Cohen, *Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S. Policymakers* (Washington, D.C.: American Academy of Diplomacy: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, United States Institute of Peace, 2008), xix-xx.

³² *Ibid.*, ix.

responding to genocide using military force. Her creation, *MARO Mass Atrocity Response Operations: A Military Planning Handbook* is the precursor to *MAPRO Mass Atrocity Prevention and Response Operations: A Military Planning Handbook*.³³ Her efforts, along with the GPTF, were in response to a potential operating environment that the USG would need to demonstrate leadership in, primarily in a globalized environment ripe for mass atrocities and genocide.

Learning from the Past, Preparing for the Future

Today, US Joint Forces operate in an increasingly complex environment. There remains a significant level of uncertainty and ambiguity concerning the sources of threats and a continual proliferation in new forms of terrorism and other operational hazards. With the diffusion of power and the capability for violence among non-state actors empowered through ready access to all types of weaponry, to include mass destruction and mass disruption, combatant commanders require innovative doctrine to address these evolving missions.

Potential adversaries are always seeking to gain an advantage over the US, particularly if there is a perceived decline in power, prestige, and influence.³⁴ Furthermore, free societies are inherently at risk to these threats and increasingly the strength of their democratic systems and moral values are tested and even employed against them.³⁵ As a result, the number of failed states continues to rise. Complex emergencies, either natural or manmade, present a high potential for mass atrocities. Urbanization and globalization place an ever-increasing number of civilians at risk, especially in times of armed conflict.³⁶

³³ Sarah Sewell, Dwight Raymond and Sally Chin, *Mass Atrocity Response Operations: A Military Planning Handbook* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 10-12.

³⁴ Department of Defense, *The Joint Operating Environment*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2010).

³⁵ The White House, "National Security Strategy May 1, 2010," http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed March 20, 2010).

³⁶ *Ibid.*,

Mass atrocity situations arise in failing or failed states, or even in seemingly stable situations following a sudden “trigger” of violence, typically extreme. This extreme violence, leading to the death and displacement of potentially millions, typically has three interlocking factors. These factors include the collapse of state authority, severe economic turmoil, and the rise of charismatic leaders proposing the “ultimate solution” to the “problem” of ethnic or religious diversity or the division of economic or political spoils.³⁷ Mass atrocities can also be a by-product of involvement by an outside actor. US forces may undertake an entirely different mission, such as conventional combat operations or humanitarian assistance, only to find themselves in the midst of a mass atrocity response as the dynamics on the ground changes.

The drive to create ethnically or ideologically pure political entities has become a consistent feature of the era of self-determination and decolonization.³⁸ The retreat of the European empires followed by the contraction of the dangerous, yet relatively stable post-Cold War confrontation has laid bare a world of complex ethnic diversity and violent groups attempting to secure power while keeping ethnic minorities under heel. As sources of legitimate order crumbled, local elites compete for the benefits of power. The stakes are particularly high in ethnically diverse regions. Ethnic confrontations in Europe generally extinguished themselves through war, including the Second World War and the Balkan Conflict; however, they may reemerge in new areas where migration, demographic decline, and economic stress take hold.³⁹ Most problematic is the vast arc of instability between Morocco and Pakistan where Shias, Sunnis, Kurds, Arabs, Persians, Jews, Pashtuns, Baluchs, and other groups compete with one another. Many areas of central Africa are also ripe for severe ethnic strife as the notion of

³⁷ David Rieff, “The Persistence of Genocide,” *Policy Review* (2011): 29-40.

³⁸ Jeffrey Herbst, *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000).

³⁹ *Ibid.*,

ethnically pure nation states animate old grievances, with Rwanda and the Congo serving as examples of where this path might lead.⁴⁰ Although there is almost certain instability within the environment for years to come, not understanding the narrative and discourse historically proves ineffective for politicians. In terms of protecting civilians and responding with force in a mass atrocity situation, the narrative and discourse against such action has been the compelling reason keeping the US from intervening. A better look at the current narrative is necessary for not only politicians, but also military planners, to understand with respect to the protection of civilians.

The Politics of Humanitarian Intervention: Realism or Idealism

In the years since the Cold War's end, public debates raged over what foreign policy the US should pursue. Realists advocate the pursuit of strategic national interests, power politics, and *realpolitik*. Realists felt retaining a country's maximum flexibility to safeguard its sovereignty and promote its interests abroad was critical. Idealists advocated humanitarianism and international law, promoted by international organizations. While Realists spoke of national security, Idealists spoke of human security.⁴¹

The US has to pursue both as the world's superpower. In today's increasingly integrated world, the US needs maintain a leadership role using both hard and soft power.⁴² For if the US pursues an exclusively Realist foreign policy, then through its own deliberate indifference it will soon discover that the "non-strategic" yet very serious "internal" problems of other countries fester into international crises. On the other hand, a foreign policy of pure Idealism would be naïve. Governments are not inherently moral entities; their behavior includes the worst atrocities

⁴⁰ The White House, "National Security Strategy May 1, 2010," http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed March 20, 2010).

⁴¹ Matthew S. Klimow, *Moral versus Practical: The Future of US Armed Humanitarian Intervention* (Kingston: Centre for International Relations, 1996).

⁴² Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Soft Power: The Means To Success In World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2005).

of modern times. But governments still create international law and they still run international organizations. To assume that any non-governmental entity can do a better job of managing the world is to assume the unproven. Until the world achieves a Utopian harmony, a powerful US encourages international peace and stability.

Moreover, the American people, a colorful mosaic of different constituencies, will never consistently support a foreign policy that is exclusively Realist or Idealist. The US political system, built upon compromise, periodic elections, and changing administrations, will not allow it. Therefore, the grand strategy of the US must be a compromise between Realism and Idealism, a strategy that is broadly supportable even if contradictory. The basic framework of this strategy is already in practice: A two-tier doctrine wherein the US safeguards its national security while leaving the UN Organization to address issues of human security.⁴³ This can be a complementary division of responsibilities, freeing the US from a plague of foreign distractions while the UN addresses them with vigor and early prevention. For this two-tier doctrine to work well, however, both tiers must be mutually supportive. Unless the US provides the UN Organization with enough support to intervene with timely decisiveness instead of with late half-measures, today's problems of human security will become tomorrow's costlier problems involving national security. In the mid-twentieth century, when the prosperity of the US was much less dependent upon the outside world than it is today, then-President Dwight Eisenhower nonetheless noted, "There can be no enduring peace for any nation while other nations suffer privation, oppression, and a sense of injustice and despair. In our modern world, it is madness to suppose that there could be an island of tranquility and prosperity in a sea of wretchedness and frustration."⁴⁴ Today, there is no privation more sinister, no oppression more overwhelming, no injustice and despair more horrific, than the deadly crime of genocide.

⁴³ Klimow, *Moral versus Practical: The Future of US Armed Humanitarian Intervention*,

⁴⁴ Ibid.,

A Reason to Intervene: National Security Interests at Stake

If morality alone is not a sufficient reason to oppose the crime of genocide and mass atrocity, there are also plenty of coldly objective reasons. In 1995, the great majority of the world's refugees were people who had crossed an international border to flee genocide. Estimates back then ranged from 14 million to 23 million displaced...the rough equivalent of the countries of Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Finland.⁴⁵ Genocide was likewise the main cause for as many as 27 million other people to flee their homes, though not yet their countries, into a category known as “internally displaced persons”—domestic refugees—a burden of care that is expensive for humanitarian relief organizations to cope with. After the Rwandan genocide in 1994, its resulting refugee crisis involving Zaire and Tanzania consumed an estimated \$2 billion in only its first two weeks—about \$142 million per day, almost \$6 million every hour—for one avoidable crisis.⁴⁶ That refugee crisis lasted for years, and it was not the only one. Yet genocide's most disruptive consequences may not be its refugees, for every major genocidal crisis also shakes the international order. No one in 1994 expected that, within two years, mass killings in tiny Rwanda would plunge the enormity of Zaire/Congo into a civil war drawing in countries from almost half of Africa—but that is what happened. In Africa, and in the Balkans, genocide has fueled cross-border guerrilla warfare, massive black market trafficking, and powerful organized crime. Its impact transcends time. More than a crime against any particular people, genocide is the ultimate crime against humanity because it violates the rights of the individual, of the group, and of all humankind, simultaneously. Instead of trying to ignore a brewing genocidal crisis until its consequences become too monstrous to ignore—an expense not even a superpower can pay

⁴⁵ John G. Heidenrich, *How to Prevent Genocide: A Guide for Policymakers, Scholars, and the Concerned Citizen* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2002).

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 17.

repeatedly—the world’s democratic powers need to prevent this crime’s most murderous forms by acting to quell each genocidal crisis relatively early.

When local sovereignty and international responsibility come into conflict, foreign policy elites must decide whether to intervene in what some see as the domestic politics of another nation-state.⁴⁷ Political scientists, policy analysts and philosophers have found no shortage of words that address the issue of whether and under what circumstances intervention is the appropriate solution to the dilemma posed by a collision between the values of local sovereignty and international responsibility.⁴⁸ Philosophers such as Michael Walzer and Robert Phillips concentrate on the issue of a just intervention. By just intervention, they refer to the use of military force against another state, justified in legal and/or moral terms. Walzer describes three kinds of just interventions, which includes the breakup of a sovereign state by the secession of a part, cases where third party intervention has already occurred and counter-intervention is requested, and the massive violation of human rights especially enslavement or massacre.⁴⁹ Phillips builds on Walzer by noting that the idea of sovereignty has lessened since the turn of the century because of two levels of argument, morality, and changing political circumstances such as the end of the Cold War and the rise of global problems such as pollution.⁵⁰ In fact, he argues that in the past the argument included that violating sovereignty led to conflict. Now, the opposite is true and there are arguments that exist that claim that not violating sovereignty erodes peace.

⁴⁷ Donald A. Sylvan and Jon C. Pevehouse, "Deciding Whether to Intervene," In *International Intervention: Sovereignty versus Responsibility*, ed. Michael Keren, & Donald A. Sylvan (Portland: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 2002), 56-74.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustration*, 2nd ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1992).

⁵⁰ Robert L. Phillips, "The Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention," In *Humanitarian Intervention* by Robert L. Phillips & Cady Lanham (Baltimore, MD: Rowan & Littlefield, 1996).

Phillips quotes the Wilton Park Report to argue that the question is not if an intervention will occur, but when.⁵¹

A Reason Not to Intervene: The Discourse in the United States

The idea of protecting civilians using the US Joint Force is particularly controversial on the heels of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some observers argue that militaries should not overly involve themselves in “saving strangers.”⁵² They worry that humanitarian interventions lead to mission creep, with an open ended task of protecting civilians that is too hard for military forces—or a waste of their time—and best left to police forces. In essence, using military forces to protect civilians is naïve and ignores operational realities. Some argue that the US populace obsesses over force protection and cannot stomach the idea of losing Soldiers to protect others from abusive armed groups and governments.

The legitimacy of humanitarian intervention came into question in the 1990s. Opponents of intervention worried that the US would use it to pursue colonial impulses or that human rights were a “Western” concept that should not be imposed on others. Naysayers argued that powerful rich countries dominated the institutions responsible for adjudicating decisions to intervene, such as the UN Security Council.⁵³ Decisions about when and where to intervene were viewed with suspicion, and many believed that such decisions had more to do with self-interest than genuine concern for the well-being of civilians.

Observers in developed countries also questioned the utility of humanitarian interventions and decried the resource expenses that they entailed. Not only were such interventions wrong in

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² This term, though not the argument, is borrowed from Nicholas J. Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).

⁵³ Donald A. Sylvan and Jon C. Pevehouse, "Deciding Whether to Intervene," In *International Intervention: Sovereignty versus Responsibility*, ed. Michael Keren, & Donald A. Sylvan (Portland: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 2002), 56-74.

practice – as interveners inevitably arrived too late, with insufficient understanding of local grievances and history – they were also wrong in *principle*, as the “realist” theory of international relations holds that foreign policy rests on the pursuit of states’ self-interest, as mentioned above. Humanitarian intervention was an oxymoron in that it sapped resources from more worthy endeavors, and often caused more harm than good. Some analysts also questioned the grounds for humanitarian intervention under international law.

The arguments on the other side of this debate were straightforward and emotionally appealing: if we can save innocent lives or protect populations, we should do so. Because the most troubling crimes against humanity in the post-Cold War era were connected to fighting within states rather than among them, states could no longer simply be left to conduct their internal business as they pleased. International legal theorists thus sought justification for humanitarian interventions in new readings of international law (much of which supports state sovereignty, due to its origins in the post-World War II era) or, as in Resolution 1296, through expanding the definition of threats to “international peace and security” (specified under Chapter VII of the UN Charter as one of two legal justifications of war, the other being self-defense) to include human rights concerns.⁵⁴ Some analysts also argued that intervention was not nearly as difficult or as risky as many people supposed. Others pointed out that militaries have served humanitarian purposes for centuries, so that humanitarian intervention was just a new shine on an old problem. Some cast humanitarian goals as a component of national security interests. Finally, practical voices argued that it is better to support Council-authorized humanitarian interventions than to leave such adventures to coalitions of the willing to define their missions as they wish. Many further noted that, like it or not, the dramatic increase in the speed of news worldwide

⁵⁴ Ibid.

increased both knowledge of crises and the calls to do something, making it likely that interventions were here to stay.

Because so few militaries have considered the operational implications of such a mandate in detail, or outlined the necessary steps for making it a reality, this remains an open question. The answer depends on who is being asked to do what. Asking lightly armed peacekeepers to protect civilians in violent regions without a clear strategy or sufficient capacity to achieve their aims may be nearly impossible. Conversely, asking nations to support a robust military intervention to protect civilians without the consent of the host nation, as suggested by *The Responsibility to Protect*, is also difficult. Both missions face added challenges if they lack sufficient capacity and political leadership to act. There are consequences for maintaining a policy of nonintervention. There are also consequences of failing to intervene properly with the full force of the US Joint Force. The following case studies will not only illuminate these consequences, but also provide background and context for the future Joint Force planner to consider when facing a potential MAPRO-type scenario. Genocides in both Rwanda and Kosovo shaped current and future strategic guidance in the Obama administration and as highlighted above, shape the narrative in terms of civilian protection.

The World Turns Its Back: Genocide in Rwanda 1994

On April 6, 1994, Hutu rebels shot down Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana's plane, killing both the Rwandan President as well as Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira.⁵⁵ Major General Romeo Dallaire, commander of the UN mission, saw the news on television and went to the Rwandan army headquarters to offer assistance. There he found Theoneste Bagosora, a Hutu Colonel and commanding officer of the Rwandan Army, arguing that the army needed to

⁵⁵ Gérard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 16-17.

take charge of the country in order to re-establish control.⁵⁶ As a result, hours following the president's death, armed Hutus took command and began targeting supporters of the Hutu-Tutsi peace process. Unbeknownst to the international community, this was all part of the greater plan within the country. Hutu gunmen and soldiers executed many of Rwanda's moderate politicians. Ten Belgian soldiers, a small fraction of the UN mission serving in Rwanda, perished that day. Hutu rebels identified potential victims ahead of time allowing them to carry out the executions with efficiency. In response to the killings, Tutsi RPF rebels resumed their civil war against the Hutu regime. From April 7 onward, the Hutu government sought to eliminate Rwanda's Tutsi. Tens of thousands Tutsi attempted to flee but Hutu rebels captured and killed most of them at checkpoints.⁵⁷ The Rwandan genocide proved to be the fastest, most efficient killing spree of the twentieth century. In 100 days, Hutu rebels murdered some 800,000 Tutsi and politically moderate Hutu.⁵⁸ Although the US received ample warning of imminent mass violence, government officials did almost nothing to stop it.

Before gaining independence from Belgium, the Tutsi enjoyed a privileged position in Rwanda. After independence, three decades of Hutu rule saw Tutsi subjected to systematic discrimination and waves of ethnic cleansing. In 1990, the Tutsi organized themselves into a militia called the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), took the offensive and gained ground on Hutu forces. In 1993, the effective RPF rebellion led to peace talks resulting in a power-sharing agreement called the Arusha Accords. UN peacekeepers would enforce the cease-fire and assist in demilitarization. The Hutus deeply resented the Arusha Accord, fearing they had lost too much power and would face reprisal. Small factions of Hutu extremists would terrorize moderate Hutu,

⁵⁶ Lt Gen Roméo Dallaire and Brent Beardsley, *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* (Toronto: Random House of Canada, 2003), 25.

⁵⁷ Douglas C. Peifer, *Stopping Mass Killings in Africa* (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 2008), 4-8.

⁵⁸ *Ibid*, 9.

Tutsi, and anyone in support of the Accord. Although some US officials expressed concerns with the Rwandan situation, diplomacy was the only element of national power made available. The US demonstrated its tendency to settle conflict through negotiations fell into the trap set by Rwandan government officials. Within Rwanda, some Hutu officials simultaneously offered assurances of peaceful settlements and while simultaneously plotting genocide. American policymakers criticized both belligerent groups and the US government officials demonstrated their reluctance to confront the situation. Even after the Hutu government began eliminating the Tutsi, the US focused on reestablishing the cease-fire in an attempt to restore the Arusha Accords. US and UN officials threatened to withdraw peacekeepers from Rwanda. Unfortunately, this was an extremely ineffective threat because the Hutu government wanted nothing more than for UN forces to withdraw.

The first wave of genocide recognition came quickly. Two days after the plane crash, Dallaire sent word to New York that the killings were motivated based on ethnicity. He described a well-organized and well-executed "campaign of terror."⁵⁹ By April 10, Dallaire was convinced that the Hutu government was targeting anyone carrying a Tutsi identification card, butchering politicians as well as civilians. He asked that the UN send reinforcements and authorize his troops to intervene to stop the killings when appropriate. At the same time, the US began evacuating 250 Americans in Rwanda in five different convoys. Had these convoys joined the existing UN peacekeepers, this group of people would have presented a sizable deterrent force in Rwanda. Rwandans began grouping under the protection of UN soldiers, but the soldiers received orders to

⁵⁹ Dallaire and Beardsley, *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*, 46-47.

help with foreign national evacuations. As 4,000 foreigners escaped the violence of those first couple of days, about 20,000 Rwandans perished unnecessarily.⁶⁰

As the world watched and waited for a response, Hutu rebels continued killing thousands of Rwandans. The question of intent resonated up and down the halls of the UN, Congress, the White House, and many other foreign governments. Dallaire tried to help journalists infiltrate the countryside amidst the killing to bear witness and be the eyes of the world. Those reporters that were able to failed to clarify the situation. Some journalists treated the violence as typical for the region and the groups. Journalists did report on the targeting of the Tutsi, the corpses piling up in city streets, and stories from missionaries and embassy officials unable to save Rwandan friends and neighbors. On April 16, the *New York Times* reported on the deaths of 1,200 men, women, and children in a church building. Human Rights Watch estimated the death toll at 100,000 (a gross understatement, as it turned out). American officials continued to avoid using the term "genocide." A UN Security Council statement on the events excluded the term based on American insistence.

Once American citizens were safe, senior officials tended to ignore the massacres. In the three months during which the genocide occurred, President Clinton never gathered his top policy advisors to discuss the massacres in Rwanda. To make matters worse, the US called for the withdrawal of Dallaire's forces and refused to support any missions that directly challenged Hutu participating in the killings. Yet, Dallaire's forces, meager as they might be, were having an effect in Rwanda. They began by rescuing some Tutsi and establishing defensive positions in Kigali. The Hutu proved reluctant to kill large groups of Tutsi in the presence of foreigners. On April 19, the Belgians pulled their forces from the UN peacekeeping mission, leaving 2,100 UN soldiers in

⁶⁰ Michael Barnett, *Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002).

Rwanda. On April 21, with strong US support, the Security Council voted to reduce the peacekeeping size to 270 personnel (although 503 ultimately remained).

Although Rwanda held one of the rotating seats on the Security Council, there was little discussion by the Council of removing their representative as a punitive diplomatic measure. More troubling than that, there was no discussion of any member state providing safe haven for Rwanda refugees. Dallaire pleaded with both the UN and the US to "neutralize" Hutu radio, but even though the US was in the best position to do so, it did nothing.⁶¹

Aside from using hard power to quell the violence, the UN and US failed to use soft power available to them.⁶² American newspapers and media remained silent about the need for intervention. Some Congress members tamely tried to get the US to help end the violence but they achieved little. Several member states called for the UN to do something. Dallaire asked the UN to add 5,000 soldiers to his force so that they could create safe havens for Rwandans.⁶³ By May 17, when most of the Tutsi victims were dead, the US accepted a version of Dallaire's plan. The US agreed to send 50 armored personnel carriers to the region, but they sent stripped-down versions that did not arrive for more than two months.⁶⁴ In June, France intervened in the situation as it announced its plans to send 2,500 troops to help set up "safe zones." Although they had some success, Rwandan Patriotic Forces (RPF) Tutsi rebels ultimately terminated the conflict by stopping the killing. Hutu perpetrators, along with over a million refugees, fled into neighboring countries. It was not until after the RPF had gained control over most of Rwanda that President Clinton closed the Rwandan embassy in Washington and froze Rwandan government assets. He sent troops and aid to Hutu refugees in Zaire, dying of starvation and cholera.

⁶¹ Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide*, 22.

⁶² Ibid., 26-27.

⁶³ Dallaire and Beardsley, *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*, 48.

⁶⁴ Ibid.,

However, the Clinton administration also made it clear that American troops were not there to keep the peace.

Although military intervention would have probably cost around \$30 million, the US ended up spending \$237 million on humanitarian aid alone.⁶⁵ The US could have chosen a number of other paths to intervene. First, the US could have agreed to Belgium's plea for UN reinforcements before the April killings. These troops could have deployed and joined Dallaire's forces to add more operational depth. The US could have acted with or without UN approval, beginning with the classification of the massacres as "genocide." The US could have made a concerted effort to jam deadly radio broadcasts or intervene within the country's internal communications network. Even a simple public threat of prosecution of war crimes by the US might have persuaded perpetrators not to act. Instead, US officials tried to present themselves as moral and good but reluctant to intervene. They argued that the war was "tragic" but created no moral or national imperative and that the conflict was internal and stemmed from colonial-era tribal strife.

Whenever the international community ignores an obvious ongoing genocide, hoping that it will fizzle out without spreading its consequences across any international borders or against any foreign interests, those consequences are, instead, more likely to become inconceivably larger than was first supposed. This is because genocide incites fear and hatred on a monstrously grand scale. Such emotions do not subside easily and they do not respect international borders—but they do encourage the violence of the past to shape the future. This happened in central Africa. It also happened in the former Yugoslavia.

⁶⁵ Scott R. Feil, *Preventing Genocide: How the Early Use of Force Might Have Succeeded in Rwanda* (New York: The Carnegie Corporation, 1998).

Almost Getting It Right: Kosovo, 1999

After the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) bombing and peace accord, Bosnia remained relatively peaceful but NATO had not followed through on locating and arresting the long list of war crimes suspects. NATO failed to arrest key figures and the leaders responsible for previous genocide in Srebrenica remained in power. Ethnic Albanians in Kosovo became disillusioned with their leader, Slobodan Milosevic.⁶⁶ In 1996 and 1997, they staged protests and demonstrations to demand an end to his rule. Eventually, the resistance turned to guerilla-style insurgent warfare. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) organized and rose up against the government. Milosevic responded by tightening control and harshly cracking down on the KLA and any sympathizers throughout the countryside. The KLA wanted to protect not only ethnic Albanians but also wanted to gain independence.⁶⁷

Tensions reached a crescendo when the KLA gunned down several Serbian police officers. Milosevic struck back with a heavy hand. Serb soldiers set fire to whole villages, killing 3,000 Albanians and expelling more than 300,000 from their homes. As Serb violence increased, journalists and human rights groups went to the region in increasing numbers. Clinton's administration came under fire as more people now realized that the US must not continue a policy of nonintervention. Throughout negotiations, Milosevic agreed to remove some of his forces from Kosovo and to allow international verifiers in. In exchange, NATO refrained from air strikes against him.

Several months later, Serb soldiers executed forty-five civilians and left their bodies in an icy ravine. In February 1999, western allies presented Milosevic with a "take-it-or-leave-it" proposal. NATO required Milosevic to remove most of his troops from Kosovo, grant significant

⁶⁶ Kiernan, *Blood and Soil: a World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur*, 391-394.

⁶⁷ May, *Genocide: A Normative Account*, 16-20.

autonomy to the province, and allow 25,000 peacekeepers into Serbia. If Serbia refused the proposal, NATO would begin bombing. Milosevic refused to consider the proposal. On March 24, 1999, NATO jets began bombing Serbia.

"It was the first time in history that the US or its European allies had intervened to head off a potential genocide."⁶⁸ While Serbian atrocities provoked the bombings, the intervention may not have happened if US interests were not threatened. The ongoing Serb-Albanian conflicts had the potential to destabilize the region, including Macedonia, and the Serb crackdown endangered a fragile peace in Bosnia in which the US had already spent more than \$10 billion.

After the bombings began, Milosevic and Serbian forces continued expelling ethnic Albanians. Serbian Army units surrounded towns and villages and frightened the inhabitants into fleeing. In many areas, Serbian forces separated the men and boys from the women and children. Serbians executed some of these men. The Serbs also destroyed all of the Albanian's identification papers and property deeds. At this point, Milosevic expelled more than 1.3 million Kosovars from their homes and over 700,000 of these individuals fled to neighboring Macedonia and Albania.

"It was the largest single act of ethnic cleansing of the decade, and it occurred while the US and its allies were intervening to prevent further atrocity."⁶⁹ NATO bombings did little to stop the ethnic cleansing. Initially, NATO executed operations in a casual manner, as though they had the advantage over Serbia. They believed that if they simply warned Serbia, Milosevic would back down and give in to Allied demands. Officials failed to understand that Milosevic would respond violently against the Albanian population. General Clark, the commander for the NATO operation, wanted to plan for a ground invasion and deploy Apache helicopters, which could fly closer to the ground. US policymakers rebuffed his efforts, due in part to being casualty averse

⁶⁸ Power, *A Problem from Hell*, 450-452.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

and unwilling to risk political capital. Only as NATO allies began to realize that defeat was a very real possibility did they intensify bombings.

On April 23, NATO officials targeted the personal property and businesses of Milosevic and his associates. They targeted transportation nodes, water, and electricity. NATO also had to avoid violating international humanitarian law with their actions. On May 24, 1999, the UN war crimes tribunal indicted Milosevic for crimes against humanity committed in Kosovo. It was the first time The Hague charged a head of state with international law violations. In Serbia, popular dissent grew in the military and some units began to mutiny and desert. On June 3, 1999, Milosevic surrendered and signed an agreement that forced Serbian forces to leave Kosovo and permitted 50,000 NATO peacekeepers to enter. Kosovo remained a part of Serbia, but they would govern themselves.

Whether or not the NATO operation in Kosovo was a success and a model for future NATO intervention remains controversial. Some have argued that the mission actually yielded more negative results than positive ones as it damaged NATO reputation by putting Albanian civilians in great danger with unobserved bombing and unexploded ordnance. Human Rights Watch determined that NATO killed around 500 Serbian and Albanian civilians in the bombings, many in questionable targets. A second criticism was that the violence committed by Albanians after NATO's victory showed there was no innocent side in the conflict. In the year after the war, ethnic Albanians killed around 1,500 Serbs and expelled from their homes another 100,000. Others argued that interested governments and refugees inflated the violence, exaggerating the atrocities.

There are three salient lessons the future Humanitarian Intervention force, in this case the US Joint Force, must glean from operations in Kosovo. First is the difficulty in defining the exit strategy for this type of unique and complex problem in terms the average citizen and military member can understand and support, and then developing campaign objectives that support the

strategic vision. Second, intervention forces cannot stop genocide from the air—forces must be on the ground, in force and remain for as long as it takes to establish civilian control in the contested area. Lastly, intervention must be timely. Speed is critical when intervening in genocide. The military needed to use maneuver warfare to create the impression of powerful forces everywhere, in control, and able to reinforce at a moment's notice. In a peace enforcement mission, this is a tall order.

These tactical concerns affect the strategic implementation of genocide intervention. At the policy decision level, American policymakers became more sensitive than ever to the perception that that they should do “something” but did not. Because NATO airpower played a significant role in reversing the 1999 Serbian ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, advocates of airpower suggested that precise aerial bombing can protect endangered civilians. While long-range precision fires results in significant damage to standing physical infrastructure, but defeating – or even identifying – tactical forces in the field or loosely organized groups of killers from afar is very difficult.⁷⁰ As the dubious effects of NATO's bombing of Serbian armed forces demonstrated, combat troops on the ground remain the best means to defeat Serbian perpetrators going from village to village and door in search of victims. As American naval commander, Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie, noted, “The ultimate determinant in war is the man on the scene with the gun.”⁷¹ Therefore, infantry personnel and appropriate support vehicles are the forces most necessary for intervention operations. Commanders look to airpower, particularly helicopter gunships and troop transport helicopters, to assist genocide prevention forces, but usually as a complementary component within an overall campaign. Many of these lessons learned from

⁷⁰ Stephen Biddle, *Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, November 2002), 28-38.

⁷¹ Quoted in C. Gray, “The Changing Nature of Warfare?” *Naval War College Review* (Spring 1996): 9.

Rwanda and Kosovo are currently under review and being incorporated into strategic guidance for the US Joint Force.

The Birth of an Idea: Operationalizing Humanitarian Intervention

The memories of Rwanda and Kosovo cast a very long shadow. The previous case studies both show what inaction or improper action can do to innocent civilians. Both genocides were distinctly different, but the effects were similar. The current Obama administration has taken human rights and protection of civilians into deep consideration, particularly as operations in Iraq and Afghanistan wind down. With that, the words “protection of civilians, mass murder, genocide, ethnic cleansing, and mass atrocity” appear in at least seventeen different Joint doctrinal publications and strategic-level policy documents. This is a good first step towards what may become the next Joint Force operating concept...MAPRO. Unfortunately, no US Joint doctrine exists that provides a clear, concise, and authoritative blueprint for Department of Defense entities to consult in developing the full range of lethal and non-lethal options for the protection of civilians in crisis.

The US Army’s Operating Concept, 2016-2028, clearly identifies the requirement to conduct mass atrocity prevention and response operations as a part of wide-area security operations and directs development of doctrine-related publications to support this effort. In the discussion of US defense strategies, under “Prepare to Defeat Adversaries and Succeed in a Wide Range of Contingencies” the Quadrennial Defense Review states the US must be prepared to respond in support of US national interests including “preventing human suffering due to mass atrocities or large-scale natural disasters abroad.”⁷² Similarly, the Guidance for the Employment of Forces (GEF) provides similar direction for the US Joint Force. One of the global end states listed in the document states: “Innocent civilians and vulnerable populations are protected from

⁷² Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review* February 2010, <http://www.defense.gov/qdr/> (accessed March 20, 2010).

the threat of mass atrocities or genocide, and foreign authorities are adequately supported to prevent mass atrocities and to mitigate the consequences of catastrophic events.”⁷³ In addition, this document provides general planning guidance for Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC) directing that plans will identify and assess potential significant human rights and civilian protection concerns that the US Government (USG) and/or partner nations could affect.

Additionally, GCCs must plan to minimize and mitigate the negative consequences of such operations to civilian populations. The GEF also provides specific planning guidance for combatant commands.⁷⁴ The National Security Strategy’s (NSS), Peacekeeping and Armed Conflict section of Chapter III “Advancing Our Interests,” provides policy guidance on preventing mass atrocities. It states that in order to

Prevent Genocide and Mass Atrocities: The US and all member states of the U.N. have endorsed the concept of the “Responsibility to Protect.” In so doing, we have recognized that the primary responsibility for preventing genocide and mass atrocity rests with sovereign governments, but that this responsibility passes to the broader international community when sovereign governments themselves commit genocide or mass atrocities, or when they prove unable or unwilling to take necessary action to prevent or respond to such crimes inside their borders. The US is committed to working with our allies, and to strengthening our own internal capabilities, in order to ensure that the US and the international community are proactively engaged in a strategic effort to prevent mass atrocities and genocide. In the event that prevention fails, the US will work both multilaterally and bilaterally to mobilize diplomatic, humanitarian, financial, and—in certain instances—military means to prevent and respond to genocide and mass atrocities.⁷⁵

The most foretelling directive by the President outlining his commitment to protecting civilians in crisis was the establishment of the Presidential Study Directive – 10 (PSD-10) on 10

⁷³ Defense Security Cooperation Agency, *Defense Security Cooperation Agency*, 1 January, 2010 http://www.dsca.mil/programs/Program_Support/DSCA%20CSP%20no%20names.pdf (accessed March 20, 2010).

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ The White House, “National Security Strategy May 1, 2010,” http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed March 20, 2010).

August 2012. PSD-10 directs the establishment of an interagency Atrocities Prevention Board (APB) by December 2011, 120 days after publication of the PSD. The primary purpose of the APB shall be to coordinate a whole of government approach to preventing mass atrocities and genocide. Doing so would ensure that the US recognizes and is responsive to early indicators of potential atrocities by its national security apparatus. Additionally, the PSD directs that all departments within the USG must develop and implement comprehensive atrocity prevention and response strategies in a manner that raises “red flags” for the National Security Staff (NSS). With this, the USG must increase the capacity and develop doctrine for our foreign service, armed services, development professionals, and other actors to engage in the full spectrum of smart prevention activities. Finally, the US must optimally position themselves to work with allies in order to ensure that the “burdens of atrocity prevention and response are appropriately shared.”⁷⁶

Based on the demands of society to stop fundamental acts of violence and hatred, the President of the US along with the Secretary of Defense directed the incorporation of human security into the strategic documents outlined above. They did this for a reason and the US Joint Force needs to understand the background behind their decisions. There is no doubt that genocide and mass atrocities exact a horrific human toll. They constitute a direct assault on universal human values, including, most fundamentally, the right to life. They also constitute a threat to US national security interests in several ways. First, genocide fuels instability, usually in weak, undemocratic, and corrupt states. These are the same types of states terrorists recruit and train, traffic humans from, and promote civil strife, all of which have damaging spillover effects across the globe. Second, genocide and mass atrocities have long-lasting consequences far beyond the states in which they occur. Refugee flows start in bordering countries but often spread. Humanitarian needs grow, often exceeding the capacities and resources of donor countries.

⁷⁶ The White House, “Presidential Study Directive – 10 August 4 , 2010,” <http://www.whitehouse.gov/.../presidential-study-directive-mass-atrocities> (accessed March 20, 2012).

Lastly, as a world remaining superpower, the US must maintain global credibility and provide the leadership required of its role within in this area. Genocides and mass atrocities force the US into compromising positions that may not be in their best interests at the time. This is the challenge the US and its military forces face today.

Taking the Lead: The US Joint Force and Humanitarian Intervention

As Bosnia, Rwanda, and operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya have shown, the international community will call upon the US Joint Force in conjunction with many other coalition nations to provide order and security in areas where simmering political, racial, ethnic, religious, and tribal differences create the potential for large-scale atrocities. As mentioned earlier, national security declines when masses of civilians die at the hands of government-sponsored perpetrators due to increasing refugee flows across borders. When murderers wreak havoc on regional stability and livelihoods, America's reputation suffers, and the ability to bring about global change falters. The US and its Allies cannot stand idle in the face of mass atrocities and genocide. Unfortunately, history has taught the US that the pursuit of a world where states (and/or non-state actors) do not systematically slaughter civilians will not come to fruition without concerted and coordinated effort.

The US Joint Force consistently demonstrates its capacity to man, train and equip for any Range of Military Operation (ROMO) in the world and can accomplish such operation effectively and efficiently. Even so, the US Joint Force has never faced the challenges of a widespread mass atrocity scenario similar to Rwanda. Operations in Libya, although categorized as a Humanitarian Intervention under the auspices of a "Responsibility to Protect," should not be a prescriptive way to address the protection of civilians. As evidenced by operations in Kosovo, the US Joint Force cannot effectively stop a mass atrocity or genocide by airpower alone without boots on the

ground. The Rwandan genocide provides a much better problem set for future planners, not Libya.

Given the future environment in which the US Joint Force could potentially operate in, the potential for executing MAPROs in the future is high and preparing the US Joint Force for it is critical. The DoD certainly understands how to structure forces to prepare them to achieve their goals given multiple repetitions through the Army Forces Generation (ARFORGEN) model as well as testing and evaluating the modularity concept throughout the Joint Force. Without question, the DoD can masterfully structure forces to meet current operational challenges. But can they meet future mass atrocity challenges? Given the political will, can the US Joint Force organize, train and deploy to protect civilians? These questions are remain open, but the chances of operational success increase if US Joint Force planners begin to think about them now. Additionally, leaders within the Joint Force who may conduct military interventions to support protect civilians also need to prepare for what those missions could entail. Until this happens, the “Responsibility to Protect” may remain a mandate that is impossible to execute until the vision aligns with the preparedness of the US Joint Force. The time has come to translate the “Responsibility to Protect” into terms that militaries can understand and implement—such as force structure, doctrine, and training—to move lofty ideals into concrete actions on the ground.

Building the Team: The Mass Atrocity Response Force

The advantages that accrue with speed in warfare have been a widely recognized concept among military thinkers for thousands of years. Observations to that effect come from writers as diverse as Sun Tzu who says, “War is such that the supreme consideration is speed,”⁷⁷ to Clausewitz describing “The second principle: act with the utmost speed. No halt or detour must

⁷⁷ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 44-45.

be permitted without good cause,”⁷⁸ to Mao stating, “Quick decision is sought in campaigns and battles, and this is true at all times and in all countries. In a war as a whole, too quick decision is sought at all times and in all countries, and a long harmful.”⁷⁹ Speed in this sense refers to swift decisions to go to war by political and military leaders, and the rapid and decisive maneuver of ground troops on the battlefield within tactical engagements.

While speed on the battlefield remains integral to modern combat, in terms of MAPRO, “rapid deployment” refers to the ability to move combat troops and equipment strategically, either from a homeland to a theater of operations, or from one theater to another. The forces that conduct such missions include medium-sized and lightly equipped ground troops that can mobilize and deploy to a theater of operations within a seven to ten days of notification.⁸⁰ They are flexible, highly mobile forces, intended by to engage in both low- and high-intensity combat operations against a range of potential opponents, on short notice, anywhere in the world. Conceptually, a Mass Atrocity Response Force (MARF) would meet this challenge. The MARF would possess a combined arms focus, which means that they employ numerous joint weapons systems and command and control capabilities to maximize the overall combat effectiveness of the force.⁸¹ For MARFs, such arms include airborne and light infantry, lightly armored ground transport, tube-launched artillery, and attack and reconnaissance helicopters.

MARF-type units either existing or in development include: the US Army’s 82nd Airborne, the US Marine Corps Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU), the British Joint Rapid

⁷⁸ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Reprint ed. (New York: Princeton University Press, 1989), 198.

⁷⁹ Mao-Tse-tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 16.

⁸⁰ There is no definitive metric for “rapid deployment.” For a basic approach, see K. Muller, “Flexible Power Projection for a Dynamic World: Exploiting the Potential of Air Power,” in C. Williams, *Holding the Line: US Defense Alternatives for the Early 21st Century* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 223-224.

⁸¹ Jonathan M. House, *Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2001), 111.

Reaction Forces, the French Ground Reaction Force Command and Ground Logistics Force Command to name a few.⁸² While the doctrinal roles for these forces vary according to the strategic goals of each country, the general rationale for MARF development is to undertake a broad range of missions, in a variety of geographical locations, on short notice. MARFs are larger and more lethal than special operations units, such as the US Special Forces or British Special Air Services (SAS). Such teams are utilized for quick-strike hostage extraction and counter-terrorist missions and operate covertly in order to leave a small footprint, while MARFs are capable of conducting overt, wide area security. However, MARFs are smaller, less lethal – and less survivable – than tank-centered, highly armored mechanized divisions, such as those involved in World War II and the first Gulf War.

Although they can conduct autonomous missions, MARFs should be the first echelon of a multi-phased military operation. They execute their mission during the early-entry phase of the operation to “kick down the door” into the contested area. This opening phase may last from a few days to two weeks before additional troops and equipment can flow into theater. Such follow-on forces, consisting of more ground troops and greater combat capabilities, arrive into the theater in overlapping sequences to meet the combatant commander’s interpretation of the situation. US Army doctrine states, “Individual phases gain significance only in the larger context of the campaign or major operation.”⁸³ Nevertheless, the first phase carried out by MARFs shapes the environment for all successive phases. Particularly in humanitarian interventions, due to heated

⁸² United Kingdom: Ministry of Defence, *Strategic Defence Review: Modern Forces for the Modern World*, presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence by Command of Her Majesty (July 1998); Richard M. Connaughton, “Organizing British Joint Rapid Reaction Forces,” *US Joint Forces Quarterly* (Autumn 2000): 91; France: G. Bloch, “French Military Reform: Lessons for America’s Army?” *Parameters* (Summer 2000): 33- 45.

⁸³ Department of the Army, *Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2008), 3-1.

domestic political constituencies, a disastrous outcome at the front end can disrupt or prematurely terminate the campaign.

There are several advantages to utilizing MARFs to prevent genocide and campaigns of mass civil violence. First, as the Rwandan genocide made clear in terms of statistics, motivated and well-organized bands of thugs can kill at a rate that makes delayed response to save lives futile. Armed with machetes and limited small arms, Hutu militia groups killed 500,000-800,000 moderate Hutus and Tutsis at a rate of 333 an hour, or five and a half per minute, over 100 days.⁸⁴ Although this rate of killing is unprecedented in the history of modern genocides, given the global proliferation of small arms and conventional weapons, future motivated perpetrators could easily possess killing tools of increased firepower and lethality, which would quickly result in mass casualties.⁸⁵

Second, intervening early can be far more effective in terms of combat casualties and the number of troops involved than larger, much more costly interventions later in the crisis. Responding rapidly to credible reports of mass violence will avoid facing a *fait accompli* on the ground to confront opponent forces before they can seize key territory and commit more murders. Arriving to a theater of combat later limits the interveners' options to manage the conflict in way that is beneficial to their forces and tactics.

Currently in development within the US Joint Force Structure is the Regionally Aligned Force (RAF) that can potentially fill the role as the MARF. The RAF concept represents an innovative and expanded approach to ongoing security cooperation missions worldwide. The US Joint Force designated as a RAF will become familiar with the region in which they may perform MAPRO-types operations and can focus intelligence and cultural training on a particular threat

⁸⁴ Philip Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families: Stories from Rwanda* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1998), 18.

⁸⁵ Alan Kuperman. *The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2001), 15-20.

region. Soldiers will maintain core combat skills and capabilities while furthering the important business of training and mentoring partner nation security forces, which will serve as a force multiplier and set the conditions for initial entry.

This concept of utilizing the RAF improves support to Geographic Combatant Commands and capitalizes on the ongoing contributions of the Total Force – Active, Guard, and Reserves– to improve partner capacity, sustain strong relationships, and to assist our Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational partners in building a stronger global security environment. This combination of skills and knowledge will continue to make US Joint Force units the security partners of choice. However, in order for any force to be effective, doctrine must clearly define the operational requirements and shape the conditions for Joint Force planners to clearly define the end state and conditions for successful MAPRO operations.

Bridging the Gap: US Joint Doctrine Must Catch Up

Doctrine is an essential component, if not the primary element, of guidance that militaries use to execute operations that implement strategic guidance at the operational and tactical level. Doctrine includes fundamental principles that inform how military institutions assess situations, plan, and implement operations. These principles form the body of knowledge from which tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) flow. Together, these principles and TTPs provide a guide to action that “combines history, an understanding of the operational environment, and assumptions about future conditions to help leaders think about how best to accomplish missions.”⁸⁶ Doctrine establishes a common frame of reference and tools that leaders use to solve military problems, promote mutual understanding, facilitate communication, and enhance effectiveness. It serves as the basis for training, and influences the organization of forces, materiel procurement, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities. Recent studies show that inadequacies in these areas

⁸⁶ Department of the Army. *Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, Appendix D, “The Role of Doctrine and Summary of Changes,”* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2008), D-1 and D-2.

undermine operations mandated to protect civilians. As such, doctrine that adequately addresses the protection of civilians could serve as a linchpin to ensure that militaries possess the capabilities to effectively prevent and respond to mass or systematic abuses of civilian populations.⁸⁷

Current US doctrine focuses on developing an armed force that possesses the training and equipment to conduct wide area security military operations.⁸⁸ Such forces are capable of executing a range of operations from high intensity lethal to long-duration non-lethal operations including stability operations, peace operations, space operations, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, foreign humanitarian assistance, noncombatant evacuation operations, crisis response and limited contingency operations. Moreover, recent conflicts clearly portend a new norm in which complex emergencies and crises evolve with operational characteristics requiring the employment of lethal, non-lethal, and humanitarian relief and assistance options performed in close proximity and in near simultaneity. The Department of Defense commonly refers to this as the “three block war.”⁸⁹

Current doctrine falls short in providing guidance on how to go about protecting civilians, leaving it to those planning and implementing such operations to develop the conceptual approaches required to turn ambition into reality as they go. Such an ad hoc approach results in operations without the strategies, preparation, resources, and assets to cope with protection crises. The concept of protecting civilians is broad and evolving. Diverse stakeholders use this term to describe efforts to protect civilians from physical violence, secure their rights to access essential

⁸⁷Alison Giffen, *Addressing the Doctrinal Deficit*, International Experts Workshop (Washington: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2010), 4-6.

⁸⁸Department of the Army, "Operational Adaptability: Operating under Conditions of Uncertainty and Complexity in an Era of Persistent Conflict 2016-2028." December 21, 2009. <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/tp525-3-0.pdf> (accessed March 20, 2012).

⁸⁹GEN Charles Krulak, "Air War College." *Air University*. January 1999. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/strategic_corporal.htm (accessed March 20, 2012).

services and create a secure environment for civilians over the long-term. A number of actors often contribute to the protection of civilians, including the communities under threat, the host-state government, multi-dimensional peace or stability operations forces, and national and international human rights and humanitarian agencies.

Doctrine is not a silver bullet, however, to ensure military capacity for specific mission types. Experts point out that not all doctrine has equal weight. Its development alone ensures neither awareness nor use by the relevant forces. Much doctrine, frankly, is ignored. The content of doctrine matters, but its importance is determined by whether it is used, and how it is applied. Gaps in military doctrine for a particular situation do not necessarily indicate that troops are ill-prepared. In some circumstances, doctrine may not address a specific situation, but personnel can develop techniques in the field. US personnel serving in Iraq have used the Internet to share ideas about how to handle scenarios they face, for example, creating new guidelines in real-time.

Militaries also have a certain degree of flexibility and can “train up” for specific missions when necessary. In other cases, doctrine for one kind of operation may be applied to another. Doctrine for the emergency evacuation of a nation’s citizens from a foreign country (non-combatant evacuation operations, or NEO), for instance, could apply to providing immediate protection to civilians from other nations as well.

One gap in US Joint doctrine is clear, however. There is a dearth of doctrine addressing operations authorized to use force to protect civilians under imminent threat either in the context of a peace support operation or as a stand-alone mission. Further, there is no common terminology to identify such missions or the likely tasks “triggered” by a mandate to protect civilians. As a result, doctrine most applicable to missions requiring personnel to protect civilians in non-permissive environments is usually considered something else. Likely scenarios are covered in part by doctrine for missions such as counterinsurgency, peace support, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, operations other than war, humanitarian assistance, non-combatant

evacuations, small wars, military policing, and civil-military cooperation. Such doctrine encompasses traditional military and humanitarian concepts of protection: as an obligation of war fighting, as observance of international humanitarian and human rights law, and as support to the provision of humanitarian space. Some peace operations doctrine also provides limited lists of military tasks for protecting civilians. Almost no doctrine, however, addresses the concept of civilian protection as the goal of a military mission. There are areas where doctrine identifies coercive tactics to protect civilians, but they are not categorized as such. Thomas G. Weiss rightly argues that “there seems to be a lack of institutional adjustment, at least as is indicated by military doctrines, that, to date, have failed to specify ways to meet the needs for coercive protection of civilians, the challenge of the responsibility to protect.”⁹⁰

Efforts to develop guidance could bear fruit immediately for pre-deployment training for the MARF. This guidance establishes a framework for Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP), which frequently precede formal doctrine and training. Military leaders could also better inform civilian leaders of what they require for specific types of humanitarian intervention operations. Although there is a move afoot to develop and flesh out the requirements for a MAPRO, there is still a tremendous amount of work to do. Scenario planning, tabletop exercises and simulations can certainly assist in the development of doctrine, guidance and TTPs.

In the long-term, the role of military actors in providing physical protection to civilians should nest with existing doctrine for peace support operations and for other kinds of military interventions. Developing US Joint doctrine could generate useful discussion among multinational organizations and with nations revising their own doctrine. Doctrine should address coercive action in achieving the mission’s broader goals and distinguish between military interventions explicitly aimed at halting mass violence and those missions where protection is but

⁹⁰ Weiss, “The Humanitarian Impulse,” in Malone, ed., *The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Pub, 2004), 48.

one of many tasks. As nations revise their doctrine, they could better identify military responsibilities and tasks for operations mandated to protect civilians. In turn, guidance should be included in more general training programs to align with revised doctrine. As major militaries address protection with doctrine, training and other guidance, there will be multiple benefits both for their own forces and for those that deploy with multinational organizations and coalitions.

Today, millions of citizens live in conflict zones, facing lives disrupted and terrorized by violence. Whereas past failures to act against mass killing have horrified and shamed the world, countries have begun to step up and take some action. The idea of protecting civilians from mass violence has prompted important debate and gained increased acceptance. While no outside parties can prevent all violence against another nation's citizens, they can take action when other diplomatic, political and humanitarian efforts fail and where violence threatens to reach extreme levels. The instinct to embrace a "Responsibility to Protect" is fundamentally a moral one. Nations are right to call for countries to stand up to their sovereign responsibilities and to shield citizens from mass violence and killings. No nation should shy from that responsibility.

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